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Distracted at the Creation: 
Washington’s China Policy
U.S. China policy in the beginning of the twenty-first century is greater than the sum of diplomatic initiatives and presidential 
statements. Since China’s rise is reshaping global politics, U.S. policy 
should be evaluated in this larger context. Washington must not only 
handle its relationship with China on a day-to-day basis, but must 
also lay the foundations for a long-term response to its rise.1 
The Bush administration came to office primed to address traditional, great power 
politics and to reassert American leadership globally, and has successfully enhanced 
deterrence of contemporary Chinese military threats. Yet, if Washington’s China policy 
is to contribute to the wider goal of sustaining the U.S.-led international order that has 
prevailed since the 1940s, the administration will have to adopt a broader set of policies 
than has been practiced in recent years. Although the Bush administration has man-
aged tactical, short-term bilateral relations with efficiency and occasional deftness, the 
broader strategic issue of a rising China has not been adequately confronted.
Although there is little the U.S. can do to stop China’s relative rise in the long run, 
Washington can solidify the U.S.-led order within which that rise occurs. Doing so not 
only enhances the United States’ military security, but also allows Washington to shape 
the norms of international behavior in ways that redound to America’s benefit and to 
the system as a whole. Of what does this international system consist? Fundamentally, 
it is a web of U.S.-led alliances and the institutions shaping the rules of international 
economic activity under the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other bodies. 
Increasingly important also is the nonproliferation regime, widely conceived. Finally, 
a number of less formal norms and practices also contribute: a norm against the use of 
force to change external borders;2 an emerging norm countering international terrorism; 
and less established domestic governance norms.
It is critical to avoid Chinese challenges to both the bilateral alliances and the broader 














m to achieve these goals: deterrence of military threats, dissuasion of broader competition, and enmeshing others within a set of practices and norms that reshape their interests.3 How well 
has each of these been pursued by Washington in the past decade?
Abandoning Global Economic Leadership
The high point of the Bush administration’s economic policy toward China has been prod-
ding Beijing into relaxing its controls on the yuan, which has appreciated nearly nine per-
cent since July 2005. While beneficial to the United States, this has been a narrow victory: 
in the 1980s, the depreciation of the U.S. dollar was carefully managed and coordinated in a 
multilateral forum resulting in the heralded Plaza Accord. Today there is no similar mecha-
nism to facilitate such shifts that includes China, nor has the Bush administration provided 
the leadership to create such cooperation.
In trade policy, the administration has at times advanced parochial interests over free-trade 
norms. Washington imposed unilateral tariffs on Chinese steel, quotas on a range of textiles, 
and charged Chinese firms with receiving unfair subsidies in paper products. Other actions 
have been more clearly consistent with WTO norms, but the uneven pattern of trade policy 
relative to free-trade norms undermines a broad norm that the U.S. assiduously built over 
the postwar era. In the most egregious case, Congress’ decision to block a Chinese oil firm’s 
bid for Unocal in early 2005 sent two messages to Beijing: China is not a trusted partner 
and energy is not a normal commodity. Rather than reassure Beijing that it could thrive 
peacefully under the U.S.-led order, China’s vulnerability to energy trade was emphasized.
The Bretton Woods system is a central element in the U.S.-led global order: Washington 
has defined its agenda over six decades. Drawing China deeper into this system and playing 
by its rules can have important benefits for the United States. Since accession to the WTO, 
China has been forced to treat Taiwan as an equal entity before a body empowered, by 
Beijing, to make binding judgments.4 Similarly, China has required its most advanced firms 
to follow transparent international accounting standards.5 In both these cases, China had 
sacrificed some of its narrow self-interest to integrate itself further into the U.S.-led global 
economic system. 
Unfortunately, Washington has eroded the global economic institutions just as Beijing has 
increased its participation in them. By virtue of its massive trade presence and growing 
outward investment flows, China is actively creating webs of its own influence, particularly 
among resource-rich autocracies. By abdicating a leadership role in the global economic 
system, the Bush administration has left a void into which China has stepped nimbly with a 
wide range of proposals and ongoing negotiations for regional cooperation. 
Taiwan and Other Provocations
In the Taiwan Strait, the Bush administration has balanced several concerns adeptly in the 
face of very contentious Taiwanese domestic politics and a rapid Chinese military buildup. 
Efforts at deterring China have surpassed those of most previous administrations. In 2001, 
Bush stated flatly that the United States would “do whatever it took to help Taiwan defend 
herself,” and his administration has supported substantial arms sales to and deepening 
military-to-military links with Taiwan. At the same time, the administration has repeat-
edly communicated that it does not support the de jure independence of Taiwan. Despite 
extremely provocative leadership in Taipei, and notwithstanding the continuing chance of 
misperception, today’s strategic stability in the Taiwan Strait is a substantial achievement. 
Beyond Taiwan, Washington has aimed to dissuade China from engaging in competition 
with the United States in a broader area and over the longer term. However, research sug-
gests the efficacy of such “general deterrence” is at best ambiguous.6 
Nevertheless, Washington has built up its military forces throughout East Asia. American 
bases there have been upgraded and are now home to several new forces: heavy bombers, 
attack submarines, additional carriers, and the most advanced missile defense destroyers 
in the U.S. Navy. Washington has been upgrading ties with a number of Asian powers on 
China’s periphery: Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, and even 
Malaysia. The Pentagon is planning to enhance its conventional strike capabilities in ways 
that seem optimized for conflicts against China (e.g., the long-range penetrating bomber 
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called for in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, Strategic 
Command’s Global Strike program, and the Navy’s aspiration to 
increase its attack submarine procurement rate).
The war in Iraq, however, has disadvantaged the Pentagon’s abil-
ity to maintain its lead over China by fundamentally reshaping 
the priorities for near-term technology development and strategic 
innovation. Rather than addressing critical needs in anti-subma-
rine warfare to respond to the frenetic pace of Chinese innovation 
and deployment, the Pentagon’s atten-
tions are focused on jamming garage-
door, remote-triggered, buried artillery 
shells. Rather than invest in advanced 
fighter aircraft able to deploy far from 
China’s sizable short-range ballistic 
missile arsenal, the Pentagon has had to 
bolt armor plates on its transport trucks. 
Similarly, the emphasis on small-scale 
conflicts has emphasized littoral combat 
ships over future destroyer development. 
These are particularly important failures 
since these modernizations would not 
only enhance American capabilities in 
Asia but would do so without being as 
provocative as other elements of the 
Bush administration’s programs.
On the strategic side, threats from small 
states warrant a thin national missile 
defense system. However, Washington 
is developing a multilayered system 
that is destined to provoke great pow-
ers. More generally, modernization of 
the U.S. nuclear arsenal and satellite 
systems calls into question the security of second-strike forces 
in China.7 In each of these areas, alternative policy could secure 
American interests with less provocation of China: Beijing’s 
concerns regarding missile defense might have been assuaged 
through the sorts of cooperative proposals that were offered to 
Russia. Discussing each side’s perceptions of the destabilizing 
effects of strategic competition could lead to tacit cooperation 
to avoid such provocations. The U.S. could shape the security 
environment in space so that China is not interested in chal-
lenging the U.S. there. The Bush administration has shown no 
initiative in any of these areas; in their abhorrence of traditional 
arms control regimes, Bush officials have actively undermined 
the prospects for progress on these issues. 
Failures to Enmesh China
If the U.S. fails to enmesh China within the U.S.-led order, 
Beijing will work to undermine it. Indeed, it has already begun 
to chart its own regional and global leadership path through 
initiatives such as the East Asian Summit, the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, “Good Neighbor” rhetoric, and 
promotion of the “Beijing model” of economic development. 
Former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s formulation 
of “responsible stakeholder” emphasized to China that it ben-
efits from the existing international order and therefore should 
shoulder responsibilities for its maintenance. Unfortunately, this 
emphasis left State when Zoellick did. Similarly on the military 
side, former Defense Secretary Don Rumsfeld’s restrictions on 
military-to-military ties—bolstered by the 2001 EP-3 inci-
dent—only gradually began to thaw. These poorly coordinated 
initiatives, based on personalities rather than sustained institu-
tionalization, have sent muddy signals to Beijing. 
On global proliferation, Bush administration officials have 
labored, with some success, to draw China into emerging and 
established norms. Beijing’s leadership of the Six-Party talks has 
served to directly implement an impor-
tant priority of the Bush administration. 
Washington has also been able to elicit 
hints that China is sympathetic to other 
aspects of American non-proliferation 
policy. More fundamentally, however, 
the Bush administration has denigrated 
formal legal structures and traditional 
arms control agreements, favoring instead 
“coalitions of the willing” and flexible 
statements of principles (e.g., those of 
the Proliferation Security Initiative start-
ed by Bush in 2003). In contrast, it is 
clear that Beijing has increasingly come 
to regard the United Nations not as 
something to be obstructed but as a use-
ful tool.8 Unfortunately, just as Beijing 
moves toward Washington’s historic 
position on institutions like the U.S.-
created UN, the Bush administration has 
pulled away.
This move away from a centuries-old 
historic position on these issues has 
costs. While it may be true that the 
post-9/11 era is unique, it is unlikely that the utility of formal 
institutions has been erased. It is precisely their cumbersome 
formality that ensures consensus on the commitments the 
institutions entail. It also imbues them with a greater degree of 
permanence than purely ad hoc coalitions can create. By shifting 
the definition of the U.S.-led order and weakening its structures, 
the Bush administration has reduced America’s long-term ability 
to co-opt the rise of China, a strategic failure of the first order. 
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